Consumer ISP
AS4837 is the autonomous system number (ASN) announced by CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone. It announces 2,498 prefixes, 57,243,392 IPv4 addresses in total. Every address inside those ranges is routed by this operator, which is what makes the number the shortest answer to who runs a given address.
| Organisation | CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone |
|---|---|
| Autonomous system | AS4837 |
| Network type | Consumer ISP |
| IPv4 prefixes | 1,280 |
| IPv6 prefixes | 1,218 |
| IPv4 addresses | 57,243,392Summed across every announced prefix. IPv6 is not counted; the numbers are meaningless at that scale. |
| In known VPN ranges | 0 of 1,280 prefixes |
| In known datacenter ranges | 0 of 1,280 prefixes |
The last two rows are a second opinion, counted against the X4BNet VPN and datacenter range lists rather than read off the operator name. A network with most of its prefixes in the VPN list is carrying anonymised traffic whatever it calls itself.
The largest ranges CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone announces, biggest first. These are a sample and not the full routing table: 2,498 prefixes do not fit on a page, and the ones worth showing are the ones most traffic comes from.
| Prefix | Family | Addresses |
|---|---|---|
| 27.192.0.0/11 | IPv4 | 2,097,152 |
| 39.64.0.0/11 | IPv4 | 2,097,152 |
| 42.224.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 60.0.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 60.208.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 101.16.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 110.240.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 112.240.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 113.224.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 115.48.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 119.176.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
| 120.0.0.0/12 | IPv4 | 1,048,576 |
Live check
The field is prefilled with 27.192.0.1, the first address of the largest range above. Change it for one from your own logs and you get the network, the operator and the verdict for that specific address.
Addresses on CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone are consumer connections: households and small businesses on a fixed line. Our engine classifies them residential, which is the class most likely to be a real customer, and the class fraud tools are least likely to flag. The catch is the residential proxy. An address here can be rented out by whoever holds the connection, and when that happens the ownership data on this page still reads as clean. That is a behavioural signal, not an ownership one.
The verdict for a single address is never settled by the ASN alone. It is the starting point, and IP Detection adds range membership, behaviour and history on top of it before it answers.
一次调用即可返回任意地址的 ASN、运营商和网络类型（托管、VPN、移动、ISP）。每月 30,000 次请求免费，无需银行卡。